


# REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE

## DAWN OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

12 & 13 February 2018

Westin Denarau Island, Nadi, Fiji



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## FDI PROMOTION AND ARBITRATION

Prof. Dr. Jordi Paniagua  
University of Valencia  
13 February 2018



United Nations  
UNCITRAL

If FDI were a country.....FDI would be a **big one**

## GDP (billions of \$)

- 1 United States 18,036
- 2 China 11,065
- 3 Japan 4,383
- 4 Germany 3,363
- 5 United Kingdom 2,861
- 6 France 2,419
- 7 India 2,419
- 8 Italy 1,821
- 9 Brazil 1,804
- 10 Canada 1,553
- 11 Korea 1,378
- 12 Russia 1,366
- 13 Australia 1,339
- 14 Spain 1,193


151. Fiji 4.86


# Outline

- 1 Motivation
  - Teaser
  - Objectives
- 2 FDI in South Pacific
  - How much
  - What
  - To whom
  - From whom
  - Why: Gravity Falls
  - To whom: Defying Gravity
- 3 FDI promotion
  - The Gravity Equation
  - Tips
- 4 FDI and International Commercial Arbitration
- 5 Conclusions



# Unbundlings


Baldwin (2016)






## Sector













## Country of Origin







# FDI Gravity

- The FDI gravity equation resembles the Newtonian gravitational equation:

$$FDI_{i \rightarrow j} = \underbrace{\frac{GDP_i GDP_j}{GDP_{world}}}_{\text{frictionless FDI}} \times \underbrace{\left( \frac{\text{Institutions}}{\text{Distance}_{i \rightarrow j}} \right)}_{\text{FDI frictions}}$$

- FDI is proportional to economic mass of countries
- FDI is inversely proportional to distance between countries
- FDI is enhanced with institutional quality like policies (e.g., International Arbitration)

# FDI Frictions

- FDI friction are those that impede international FDI flows
- Types of trade & FDI frictions:
  - Natural: Geography & History & Culture & Language
  - Man-made or institutional: additional costs impeding trade if physical distances (or other natural costs) were absent
    - Mainly attributable to policy decisions.

# Man-made (institutional) Frictions


- Policy
  - Tax Policy (Desai et al., 2004)
  - Tariff-jumping FDI (Blonigen, 2002)
- Economic integration
  - Bilateral investment treaties (Falvey, Foster-McGregor 2018)
  - Currency (Gil, Llorca & Paniagua, 2018)
  - Social media (Paniagua et al., 2017)
- Institutional quality
  - Legal rights (Paniagua & Sapena, 2014)
  - Commercial arbitration (Myburgh & Paniagua, 2016)

# FDI Promotion

Countries have four alternatives to escape the gravity pull and promote FDI

- ① Get closer
  - Reduce transaction costs: Common language, colonial links
- ② Grow bigger
  - Economic growth: Human capital, productivity
- ③ Be social
  - ① What happens in Fiji stays online!
- ④ Be smarter!
  - ① Economic integration
    - Bilateral investment agreements
  - ② Legal framework
    - ① Arbitration, business environment

# What is International Commercial Arbitration?





# Model laws & arbitration & FDI

- FDI:
  - Myburgh, A., & Paniagua, J. (2016). Does International Commercial Arbitration Promote Foreign Direct Investment?. *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 59(3), 597-627.
  - Mocheva, N., Myburgh, A., & Paniagua, J. (2018). The impact of UNCITRAL on FDI. *Proceedings of the 50th Anniversary UNCITRAL Congress*
- Trade:
  - Berkowitz, D., Moenius, J., & Pistor, K. (2006). Trade, law, and product complexity. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 88(2), 363-373.
  - Gil-Pareja S., Llorca-Vivero, R. & Paniagua, J. (2018). Trade Law and Trade Flows. *Mimeo, University of Valencia*

# International Commercial Arbitration & FDI

Myburgh & Paniagua (JLE, 2016)

- ① Arbitration brings countries together and affects FDI;
  - ① Intl. Commercial Arbitration reduces costs associated with domestic judicial systems;
- ② Improvement in arbitration regimes has a larger effect on the size of FDI investments than new projects
  - ① Estimates show that FDI flows are 77% higher when both countries ratify the NY arbitration convention
- ③ The effect of arbitration is greater in higher FDI levels (larger investments)
  - ① FDI diversion for small and medium projects
  - ② FDI creation for large projects



# Take-aways

## Gravity Falls


- Cherish Gravity
  - Get closer
  - Grow bigger
  - Be social
  - Be smarter
    - Use international commercial arbitration!

# Sectors

Activity type	Activity	UNCITRAL's initiatives		
		NY Convention	Model Law on Arbitration	Model Law on Conciliation
Customer	Business services	+	+	
	Sales & Marketing	+		
	Customer care Tech support			
	Shared services			
Complex	Headquarters			
	Design	+		
	ICT	+	+	
	RD Education			
High Fixed costs	Maintenance Extraction			
	Manufacturing Logistics			
	Construction	+	+	

# Costs of arbitration


Myburgh & Paniagua (JLE, 2016)



Source: ICC arbitral cost calculator

# Crossing borders with social media

Paniagua, Korzynski & Mas-Tur (2017)



# Quantile regression

Myburgh & Paniagua (JLE, 2016)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Q(0.10)	Q(0.25)	Q(0.50)	Q(0.75)	Q(0.90)
	CY&CP FE	CY&CP FE	CY&CP FE	CY&CP FE	CY&CP FE
$\ln(Y_{it} \cdot Y_{jt})$	0.378*** (0.00)	0.417*** (0.00)	0.457*** (0.00)	0.500*** (0.00)	0.563*** (0.00)
$FTA_{ijt}$	-0.038* (0.02)	0.013*** (0.00)	-0.059*** (0.00)	-0.023** (0.01)	-0.186*** (0.01)
$BIT_{ijt}$	-0.126*** (0.01)	-0.066*** (0.01)	-0.119*** (0.00)	0.067*** (0.00)	0.011** (0.01)
$NYC_{ijt}$	0.041*** (0.01)	0.131*** (0.01)	0.164*** (0.00)	0.204*** (0.01)	0.192*** (0.00)
$NYC1_{ijt}$	-0.093*** (0.01)	-0.112*** (0.01)	-0.023*** (0.00)	-0.081*** (0.01)	0.043*** (0.01)
Observations	39393	39393	39393	39393	39393
Average Project size (mUSD)	4.54	13.99	27.9	61.09	78.99

Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses,

Country pair, country\*year (3 years) and year fixed effects included. Dep variable:  $\ln(\text{FDI}+1)$

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$